Keywords
racionalismo moral
juicio moral
teoría de las decisiones
How to Cite
Abstract
The reason-emotion dualism infers that there are two spheres for ethical evaluation: a rational one of logical thinking with which weighted moral decisions are made and, on the other hand, and in the same person, a non-rational, emotional way, which responds to automatically to stimuli and impressions. Jonathan Haidt (2001) trying to save this bivalent gap, proposed as a solution his approach to social intuitionism that amalgamates both the emotional-intuitive position for the construction of moral judgment, and anthropological, social and cultural elements that form the definitive criterion of the person to face moral dilemmas. On the other hand, Lawrence Kohlberg (1955) considers that moral judgment is constructed gradually and progressively from education rationally. In this work, both Haidt's theory and Kolhberg's theory are criticized, as it is considered to generate a reductionist and, at times, exclusionary dichotomy between the rational processes formative of morality and impressions generated by emotions. It is concluded that it is possible to educate the criterion for moral judgment because, in essence, there is no exclusionary dichotomy between intuition and reasoning, and that, on the other hand, they complement each other.References
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